Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal
Issue 20

Article 28

7-1-1999

An Informal History of Classical Rhetoric for
Mathematicians (Plato and Aristotle)
Phillip Keith
St. Cloud State University

Sandra Z. Keith
St. Cloud State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj
Part of the Intellectual History Commons, Logic and Foundations Commons, and the Logic and
Foundations of Mathematics Commons
Recommended Citation
Keith, Phillip and Keith, Sandra Z. (1999) "An Informal History of Classical Rhetoric for Mathematicians (Plato and Aristotle),"
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal: Iss. 20, Article 28.
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj/vol1/iss20/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

An Informal History of Classical Rhetoric for Mathematicians
(Plato and Aristotle)
Philip Keith
Sandy Z. Keith
St. Cloud State University, MN

Rhetoric, “the art of persuasion,” gets a bad rap among
workers in the mathematical sciences. This is unfortunate, since although mathematics is concerned primarily with the demonstration of formal truth, mathematicians do live in the world and need to concern
themselves with persuading students, business agents
and others not on the mathematical team of the importance of their enterprise. The natural revulsion
among keepers of the flame of formal truth for the
dirty instruments and forms of public persuasion is a
handicap (not fatal yet, perhaps, but a handicap nonetheless) in attracting students and obtaining public
support. Thus, a brief history of the origins of rhetoric and its relation to the development of logic—mathematical and otherwise—can be useful in providing a
view of the relation between those two integral arts
of “fixing” belief, to use the term favored by the philosopher and mathematician C.S. Peirce.
Rhetoric had its institutional roots in the political chaos
in Greece around 400 B.C. following Sparta’s defeat
of Athens and the temporary collapse of democracy.
Although the models of expression favored by rhetoricians trace back to Homer and the oral tradition of
heroic action and expression, the availability of tutoring in rhetoric is tied to the period of the restoration
of democracy after the oligarchic tyranny following
the defeat of Athens. During the tyranny, arbitrary
seizure of property and assassination were common,
and, as in recent history in South Africa and Central
America, injustices filled lists waiting for redress.
With the restoration of the democracy, courts were
established to hear claims and grievances. These
courts, in the Athenian pattern, did not have established officers, such as judges, prosecutors, and licensed defense lawyers. They were made up of groups
of citizens—as many as fifty—who listened to the
grievances of citizens and the defenses of those accused, and delivered judgment on the spot. In this situation, cleverness in speaking would provide a strong
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advantage for plaintiffs and accused, and as in courts
today, the expression of pain and suffering would
carry a lot of weight. Not surprisingly, some entrepreneurial individuals offered lessons in speaking to
get maximum benefit from these situations. The best
known of these individuals are Corax and Tisias, to
whom the art of rhetoric is traced by Aristotle.
Imagine the typical case. The “jury” of 50 men sits in
an open theater of sorts while the plaintiff explains
how his brother was beaten to death and his home
seized by the defendant. In his complaint he goes into
great detail about the agonizing pain his brother suffered, the misery of his brother’s wife and children in
the loss of their father, the humiliation of their loss of
privilege and income, the jealous glee of the executors of the forfeiture and the illicit pleasure they take
in the property to which they have no right—all of
this aimed at arousing the active sympathy and outrage of the jury. The defendant parries in the same
terms, pointing to injustices committed by the dead
brother that earned him his fate, the insult and pain
caused by the present claim, the well-known skulduggery of the plaintiff, and how the misery of the
defendant’s wife, children and father was due to the
wretchedness of the home forfeited to the defendant
which has since been transformed through considerable effort, expense and good will within the last ten
years into a location of public hospitality.
Since such skill in arguing had a substantial value, it
became a major part of the educational framework.
Teachers of the youth of Athens were expected to provide experience and training to prepare men to defend themselves against complaint, much as it was
expected that young men would learn to defend themselves with weapons. It is hardly surprising then that
the youthful Plato, in observing such processes, would
be appalled that this could be considered a form of
Justice, a search for Truth. And so rhetoric as an art
became the target of special scorn as an educational
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discipline because of its claim to discover truth and
further justice. In his dialogues on rhetoric, specifically the Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates attack common rhetorical practice as training in making the worst appear the better cause. This competed
with training in reasoning, which he called dialectic.
(Although this is a yawing term, cruising across philosophical trade routes, it can generally be taken to mean
discussion logic, or finding questions for exploratory
discussion.) Plato wanted to ask questions and shape
definitions to clarify and comprehend Truth, Justice,
Virtue; in his Academy the mode of dialectic was the
foundation of education.

simple yet profound set of categories, Aristotle establishes an observation that speech situations are either
judicial, deliberative, or ceremonial (epedeictic). Judicial speech aims at accusing someone of crimes they
have committed in the past; deliberative speech aims
at recommending policy for the future; and ceremonial speech aims at praising or blaming a person for
their character. These are the only types of speech that
operate with the public at large. Within any of these
categories (think: rows), one may use one of three different appeals (think: columns) that are grounded in
the speaking situation. One may appeal to the feelings and perceptions of the audience (pathos), as in
the court speeches that so appalled Plato. But one may
Fortunately for the western world, one of Plato’s stu- also base an appeal on one’s own character or relidents and teaching assistants at the Academy was ability (ethos), or on the argument or evidence (logos).
Aristotle, who took a differIn response to Plato’s idenent view. Aristotle was intification of rhetoric with
terested not just in the esbasically a single mode of
sential truth and falsity of ...it is necessary to distinguish between persuaspeech (judicial aim with
methods of thinking and sion relative to the community at large, and
emotional
appeal),
knowing, he was also interAristotle’s definition of
persuasion within a field of shared assumptions
ested in describing how
rhetoric is a full grid with
in a particular investigation...
things worked, practically.
lists of terms expanding
Aristotle’s Rhetoric seems to
each of the nine cells of the
have been an outgrowth of
grid. Aiming at comprehenhis discussions of rhetoric at the Academy. (Plato must siveness of description, he expands the audience aphave decided that the Academy needed to have in- peal, for instance, from appeals to anger and sympastruction in rhetoric to attract students, but he was thetic sadness to a full description of the kinds of asdarned if he was going to do that, so he gave the job sociations and perspectives different audiences tend
to this talented junior staffer.) Aristotle’s approach was to share. One might say that in so doing, he wrote the
neither to teach merely the Coraxian tricks, or critique first descriptive psychology. For example, for old men,
the practice of such tricks, but to ask: what kind of happiness takes the form of protection or successful
thing is rhetoric? And his explanation in the Rhetoric children while for young men it might be challenge
and the larger Organon, of which it is essentially a part, or opportunity to achieve honor . So if you are speakcan be read as an answer to Plato’s concerns, an an- ing to an audience of senior citizens, be aware of this
swer that in a sense follows Plato’s method.
difference in shaping your material. Young men tend
to pay more active attention to personal slight than
“Plato!” he seems to say, “hold on a minute—you are old men, who feel more secure in their established
getting some things mixed up! First of all, you define reputations. This sort of listing-out description easily
rhetoric in terms of the example of these court pro- expands into an outline that fills several hundred
ceedings. That’s far too narrow a definition. Rhetoric pages without very much analysis or detailed develshould be described in terms of its situation and its opment.
appeal. Those court proceedings are examples of
speech in judicial situations emphasizing an appeal But defining rhetoric is only part of Aristotle’s reto audience emotion. The jury isn’t trained, they have sponse to Plato. Secondly he points out that it is necno standards of justice, no code to enforce, so natu- essary to distinguish between persuasion relative to
rally the most effective appeal is to their sympathy the community at large, and persuasion within a field
and anger. But surely that doesn’t define the only type of shared assumptions in a particular investigation—
of speech a citizen needs to do.” In a wonderfully i.e., within a discipline. Within a field of exploration,

❝

Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #20

49

individuals share common terms and assumptions
from which they discover new truths or facts, and
within which they give value to certain observations.
Since those assumptions, truths, and facts are not universally known, the truth of in-discipline reasoning
is not self-evident to society as a whole. Assumptions
may be passed on with the authority of the discipline,
and thus may not be questioned by the masses, but
that is due to the enforceability of authority, not to
their reasonability. Aristotle’s presentation of logic in
the Organon and the Rhetoric assumes that Plato’s
model for reasoning is the basis for the development
of a discipline, a science. If one assumes, as scientists
and mathematicians too frequently do, that the principles and assumptions of scientific discourse are selfevident in the public arena, one tends to lose debates.
In his discussion of Logic in the Organon (Topics, Categories, Prior and Posterior Analytics), Aristotle retains this distinction, setting up syllogism as a method
of reasoning from demonstrated premises to demonstrable conclusions, and setting up dialectic (the basis
of logos in the Rhetoric) as discussion from common
assumptions and opinions that are simply accepted
without needing to be demonstrated. Thus, in doing
rhetoric, you argue from your audience’s opinions.
In science, you argue from demonstrated truths. However, one must note that just as some audience opinions may be wrong (and the ethical character of the
speaker may be sacrificed in the long run if audiences
perceive him/her to be relying on audience beliefs that
he/she knows are wrong), demonstrated premises
may in the future be discarded by a scientific community -alchemy, for example. Aristotle points out that
rhetorical argument aims to persuade audiences, not

to do science. Rhetoric (and dialectic) is about public
speaking (and informal discussion), not about understanding the nature of the mind, insects, the weather,
or morality.
However, Aristotle does point out that rhetoric and
dialectic can play a role in discovering truth. These
subjects are useful in education (= propaedeutic), and
they can be useful in assessing first principles or premises. The problem with first principles is that they
have not been demonstrated to be true. Rhetoric and
dialectic cannot demonstrate their truth—nothing can.
But rhetoric and dialectic can assist in comparing the
meaning and effect of statements of first principles,
and there are advantages in being able to do that. It is
easy to explain the particular balance between dialectic and syllogism in the medieval age given its prescientific situation and the dominance of religious perspectives in education and social understanding. The
classical model for educated discourse provided in
Aristotle is a complex weaving of social practice and
theoretical understanding that values both. Since
Descartes and Bacon, the balance in our mode of discussion has been shifting toward emphasizing and
valuing scientific rather than rhetorical reasoning. As
a result, educated discourse has become more arcane
and alienated from the common discourse. The classical model of the Greeks provides a guide to righting
this balance with the assumption that any educated
person needs to be able to operate in both public and
within-discipline modes. Not being able to do so constitutes a cultural handicap which we must define our
educational principles and educational principles and
methods to correct.

A Collection of Ideas on Systems and their Extensions
continued from page 46
way to extend the human plane in a new dimension.
This leads, almost invariably it seems, to competing
claims as to which extension is the correct one. This is
rather hard to avoid when various of these posited
gods each reveal to a chosen messenger on earth that
it is the one true god and that all others are the invention of man.
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